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This study is the first to examine how both the domestic equity benchmark concentration 
and the Directive 2009/65/EC on risk of portfolio diversification may distort the accuracy 
of the original Active Share measure of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) in the Eurozone 
mutual fund industry. The main contribution of this paper is to provide statistical 
significance to the Active Share measure considering the spurious activity levels due to 
this benchmark concentration. The empirical application to a comprehensive sample of 
domestic equity funds provides evidence of significant differences in the actual levels of 
active management in the Eurozone mutual fund industries.  
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Today’s investors are increasingly interested in mutual fund selection, thereby demanding 
detailed information and investment advice. One of the most extensive debates in mutual 
funds is concerned with the efficiency of actively managed mutual funds, as they are a 
major component of this industry
1
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 Mutual funds are an important financial institution in the global markets. In Q4 
2018, the Total Net Assets (TNA) of worldwide-regulated open-end fund assets were 
€45.65 trillion. The United States and Europe are the most relevant industries, accounting 
for 46% and 34% of the worldwide distribution of mutual fund assets, respectively (The 
European Fund and Asset Management Association EFAMA, 2018). 
 Since the seminal paper of Sharpe (1966), an extensive body of literature has 
sought to clarify the performance value of active management. Relevant performance 
measures have been developed mainly based on portfolio return records (e.g., Jensen, 
1968; Fama and French, 1993; Grinblatt and Titman, 1993; Elton et al., 1996) and 
portfolio holdings (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Daniel et al., 1997). In addition, 
many papers have focused on the persistence of the results of active management (e.g., 
Carhart, 1997; Wermers, 2000; Bollen and Busse, 2004; French, 2008; Fama and French, 
2010). 
 Traditionally, the assessment of active management has relied on tracking error 
(TE), which is the divergence of portfolio returns relative to a benchmark. More formally, 
Rudolf et al. (1999) define TE as the time-series standard deviation of the difference 
between portfolio and benchmark returns. The objective of active management is to 
obtain higher returns than the benchmark as well as a low TE. 
 Cremers and Petajisto (2009) proposed Active Share (AS) to measure the 




Active Share (𝐴𝑆) =
1
2
∑ |𝑤𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑖 − 𝑤𝑏enchmark,𝑖|
𝑁
𝑖=1   (1) 
where 𝑤𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑖 and 𝑤benchmark,𝑖 are the portfolio weights of stock i in the mutual fund and 
the benchmark, respectively, and N is the total number of stocks that is included in either 
the fund or the benchmark. 
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 According to Morningstar statistics, worldwide, non-active funds represented 27% of total funds managed 
in 2017, up from 16% in 2010. 
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 Recently, Cremers (2017) introduced a new formula for AS. This formula expresses AS as equal to 100% 
minus the sum of the overlapping weights between the portfolio and its benchmark, thus emphasizing that 
AS is only lowered by overlapping positions that are in both the fund and the benchmark. Although this 
new approach tends to facilitate the use of AS in computational terms, AS continues to rely on both the 
choice of benchmark and the portfolio management style. 
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According to Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013), AS and TE 
emphasize different aspects of active management. AS is a reasonable proxy to identify 
security selection, while TE is better suited to measuring the volatility of portfolio returns 
relative to the benchmark. These two dimensions together cover the level and the sources 
of active management. AS matters for investors in three ways. First, AS may be helpful 
in selecting actively managed funds, that is, funds overseen by managers who are willing 
to beat the benchmark. Second, AS enables one to obtain a proxy of managers’ potential 
stock-picking abilities when they overweight (underweight) stocks that beat (are beaten 
by) the benchmark. Third, investors with access to AS would be more likely to evaluate 
the management fees charged by mutual funds with respect to the level of active 
management. 
 Since the seminal paper of Cremers and Petajisto (2009), numerous papers have 
successfully applied AS to US mutual funds. Schlanger et al. (2012) show that AS can 
play a useful role in manager selection. Cremers and Pareek (2016) explain and predict 
the ability of portfolio managers to use both high active share and patient investment 
strategies to outperform their benchmarks. Other papers support the aforementioned 
advantages of applying AS in US mutual funds. For example, Jiang et al. (2014) find that 
overweighted positions in funds relative to their benchmarks have outperformed their 
underweighted positions, showing the shrinking fraction of assets managed by active-
fund managers. 
 Muller and Weber (2012), Lee and Morri (2015), Cremers et al. (2016) and Frijns 
and Indriawan (2018) are recent papers confirming that previous results for US mutual 
funds hold in other markets, such as New Zealand and Europe. 
 However, not all academics support the aforementioned results. For instance, 
Muller and Ward (2011), in contrast to previous studies, find no relationship between the 
level of AS and mutual fund returns in the South African market. More recently, Ang et 
al. (2017) also find that there is no significant evidence that AS identifies skilled active 
management and predicts future performance. Moreover, AS seems to be far from stable, 
as Huang et al. (2011) show that mutual funds significantly change their risk level over 
time. 
 The strongest claims against the AS are found in Frazzini et al. (2016), who show 
that mutual funds with the highest AS measures are related to small and mid-cap stock 
benchmarks and the poor performance records of these benchmarks over the 1990–2009 
period. AS is very sensitive to the benchmark characteristics, and the AS results will 
therefore be driven by this measure’s strong dependence on the benchmark. The choice of 
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inappropriate benchmarks that do not properly reflect the portfolio’s investment style will 
result in inaccurate AS. However, Petajisto (2016) recently refuted these claims, noting 
that the analysis has significant faults and ignores relevant discussion, according to the 
previous findings included in Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013). 
 In addition to addressing the aforementioned problem, this paper provides 
evidence of the potentially misleading results that the application of AS provides when 
concentrated benchmarks are considered. Specifically, the accumulated weight of equity 
benchmark constituents in domestic Eurozone markets is highly concentrated in fewer 
constituents than in US benchmarks. Focusing on US mutual funds, we can observe that 
in the S&P 500 benchmark, the weight of the top 10 constituents is 20.7% and the largest 
weight of a constituent is 3.7% (S&P Dow Jones Index, 2018). In the Eurozone, we find 
domestic benchmarks with heavy concentration levels. For example, the accumulated 
weight of the top 10 constituents in the IBEX 35 Spanish benchmark is 70.82%, with the 
largest weight of a constituent being 14.34% (Bolsa de Madrid, 2019). However, we also 
find domestic Eurozone benchmarks with lower levels of concentration. For example, the 
accumulated weight of the top 10 constituents in the CAC 40 French benchmark is 
54.81%, and the largest weight of a constituent is 11.14% (CAC 40 Index, December 
2018). 
Accordingly, 1) the AS obtained in US mutual funds cannot be compared with the 
AS obtained in mutual funds in the Eurozone, and 2) the AS obtained in the different 
domestic Eurozone markets are not comparable to each other due to the assorted 
concentration levels of the domestic Eurozone benchmarks. The main contribution of our 
paper is to obtain comparable results given that our approach controls the effect of the 
different concentration levels of each benchmark in the context of legal restrictions on the 
portfolio concentration. 
 In addition to the limitations previously identified, it is necessary to test how the 
current European directive on the risk of portfolio diversification will influence AS 
accuracy. The Directive 2009/65/EC sets the rules relating to mutual funds as one of the 
major financial instruments included in the Undertaking for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities (UCITS) category
3
. It is the fourth version of UCITS legislation, 
recasting the seminal UCITS Directive 85/611/EEC. 
                                                          
3
 UCITS was devised to facilitate cross-border investments within the EU. The aim of the UCITS directive 
was to remove barriers to the cross-border marketing of units of collective investment funds within the EU 




 Because mutual funds are designed to be suitable for retail investors, their rules 
are based on certain levels of portfolio diversification with the aim of reducing their 
vulnerability to the performance of a small number of assets. The current Directive 
2009/65/EC specifies in article 52 (paragraph 1) that “UCITS shall invest no more than 
5% of its assets in transferable securities or money market instruments issued by the same 
body; or 20% of its assets in deposits made with the same body. Member States may raise 
the 5% limit laid down in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 to a maximum of 10%. If 
they do so, however, the total value of the transferable securities and the money market 
instruments held by the UCITS in the issuing bodies in each of which it invests more than 
5% of its assets shall not exceed 40% of the value of its assets. That limitation shall not 




 On the one hand, the domestic Eurozone benchmarks show a variety of 
characteristics in terms of the concentrations of their constituents. On the other hand, 
there are regulatory issues that prevent portfolio concentration. This framework could 
involve conflicting patterns in the search for active management based on the AS. That is, 
the high concentration level detected in the domestic Eurozone benchmarks conflicts with 
the 10% concentration limit generally included in the regulation. Therefore, for 
concentrated benchmarks that include constituents weighted close to or above 10%, 
mutual funds are not allowed to overweight those constituents in their portfolios. In fact, 
the only way they can achieve extra AS is by underweighting such constituents. In 
practice, the aforementioned framework means that there are significant limits to 
increasing AS, even for actively managed mutual funds. 
 Our paper is the first to evaluate the consequences of both the assorted 
characteristics of domestic Eurozone benchmarks and the European regulation preventing 
portfolio concentration in the appropriate estimation of AS. Furthermore, our study 
identifies truly active management in domestic equity funds (mutual funds that invest 
principally in domestic stocks) in the Eurozone markets, solving the aforementioned bias. 
 Our findings suggest that the high concentration level and the heterogeneity 
present in the domestic equity funds in the Eurozone prevent the direct comparability of 
the AS. Therefore, it would be necessary to consider the level of AS over the spurious 
level and the characteristics of every market, each of which produces significant and 
different styles of active management. 
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 In terms of investment constraints, Article 52 in the Directive 2009/65/EC is similar to Article 22 in the 
seminal Directive 85/611/EEC. Thus, this specific part of the EU regulation has not changed since 1985. 
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 This paper has important implications for policymakers and practitioners of the 
domestic equity fund industries in the Eurozone. In the strongly regulated European 
markets (Benink and Schmidt, 2014), where policy literature are consistent in the 
importance of detection of market abuse (Cumming et al., 2018), our unbiased approach 
allows these market players to identify the accurate levels of active management of each 
industry after considering both the regulation of portfolio diversification and the 
concentrated domestic equity benchmarks. Market supervisors will have a better picture 
of the active management map to develop appropriate regulations of the mutual fund 
industry. In addition, our approach should help practitioners and investors to effectively 
find out the level of active management of domestic equity funds and therefore provide 
information for fund management companies to replace for no actual performing 
managers (Clare et al., 2014). Besides, our results should help to reduce opacity in the 
management fees charged by the funds are justified by accurate measures of active 
management (Casavecchia and Hulley, 2018)  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. We describe the data from Eurozone 
Benchmarks in Section 2. Section 3 describes the method of obtaining spurious Active 
Shares. Section 4 determines the significant Active Share above the spurious level. 
Section 5 presents the empirical application to domestic equity funds in the Eurozone 




2.  Data 
We select those mutual fund industries that have been present in the constitution of the 
Eurozone
5
. These markets share at least eighty percent of the total net assets (TNA) of 
European mutual funds from 1999 to 2016 (Investment company Institute, 2017) and at 
least eighty-three percent of domestic equity funds in the European mutual fund industry 
(EFAMA, 2017).  
From Morningstar, we select the most frequent primary prospectus benchmark 
reported by the domestic equity funds registered in each Eurozone member
6
. Datastream 
provides comprehensive data of these relevant benchmarks. We obtain the monthly 
characteristics of each domestic benchmark, such as their constituent identifications 
(ISIN code) and their constituent weights. Our benchmark sample covers January 2002 to 
December 2016 and includes 45,735 constituent weights. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of our final benchmark sample
7
. From the 
information provided by the maximum weight of a benchmark constituent together with 
the number of constituents over a 10% weight, we identify the potential conflicts between 
the benchmarks and the limits of the portfolio concentration established in the Directive 
2009/65/EC. In addition, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to compare the 
concentration levels of our domestic benchmark sample
8
. All these figures highlight the 
potential problems in AS accuracy with respect to portfolio concentration limits, 
especially in the most concentrated benchmarks of our sample, such as ATX 20 (Austria), 
BEL 20 (Belgium), ATHEX 20 (Greece), PSI 20 (Portugal) and IBEX 35 (Spain). In 
contrast, CAC 40 (France) and DAX 30 (Germany) are the least controversial domestic 
Eurozone benchmarks in terms of HHI
9
. 
                                                          
5
 This area was created in 1999 by eleven founding states: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. Greece joined the Eurozone in 2001. 
Coins and banknotes were first used on 1
st
 January 2002 in all twelve Euro member states. Luxembourg 
and Ireland are excluded from our sample for two different reasons. First, there is not a specific domestic 
benchmark in Luxembourg and second, Morningstar does not provide a domestic equity category for Irish 
mutual funds. 
6
 We assume a potential benchmark ‘gaming’ in the selection of our sample (Sensoy, 2009). But even 
though the primary prospectus benchmark may not match the fund’s style, it should be included as funds 
will likely present high AS figures. Otherwise, this exclusion might influence our further empirical results. 
7
 Datastream does not provide information for benchmark constituents for ATHEX 20 (Greece), FTSE MIB 
40 (Italy), and PSI 20 (Portugal) for 2002-2005, 2002-2003 and 2002-2006, respectively. 
8
 HHI is an index that measures the market concentration of an industry and is calculated by squaring the 
market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. The index 
ranges from 0 to 10,000. The relative comparison of the HHI figures of our benchmark sample permits the 
identification of the level of concentration of each domestic benchmark in relation to the others. 
9
 Our domestic sample includes much more concentrated benchmarks than overall Eurozone and European 
benchmarks such as Eurostoxx 50 (HHI=282.44) and Eurofirst 100 (HHI=371.48), respectively. We get 
similar conclusions for well-known benchmarks of both the US market (S&P 500, HHI=133.32) and the 
UK market (FTSE 100, HHI=323.07). Further details are available upon request. 
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3. Definition of spurious Active Share 
In this section, we assess a spurious AS (sAS) resulting from the divergence between the 
limits established by the regulation on risk diversification in Europe (by the Directive 
2009/65/EC) and the high levels of concentration of the domestic Eurozone benchmarks, 
which, in many cases, exceed the maximum weight per constituent allowed by the 
regulation. We develop an algorithm that identifies sAS as the minimum AS driven by 
both the requirements of the European regulation and the benchmark concentration. That 
is, sAS is the minimum AS that is not a consequence of active decisions made by the 
equity fund manager (see details of the whole process of this algorithm in Appendix 1). 
In our algorithm, we work with the weights wi of the i=1..., n constituents that are 
part of each domestic Eurozone benchmark on a monthly basis. The weight of each 
constituent i is positive, and the sum of these weights for each benchmark is 100%. 
 𝑤𝑖 > 0             ∀ 𝑖 (2) 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 100% (3) 
First, we sort the weights of the n benchmark constituents from the highest to the 
lowest into three excluding groups (j, k, l) based on the limits of portfolio concentration 
in article 52 of the Directive 2009/65/EC. 
𝐼𝑓 𝑤𝑖 > 10%  then  rename 𝑤𝑖 𝑎𝑠 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
                      ∀ 𝑖  (4) 
𝐼𝑓 5% ≤ 𝑤𝑖 ≤ 10%  then  rename 𝑤𝑖 𝑎𝑠 𝑤𝑖
𝑘         ∀ 𝑖  (5) 
𝐼𝑓 𝑤𝑖 < 5%  then  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑤𝑖 𝑎𝑠 𝑤𝑖
𝑙                         ∀ 𝑖  (6) 
These groups let us identify the weights over the concentration limits that must be 
truncated to achieve the diversification rules included in the Directive 2009/65/EC. This 
process is first applied in group j of benchmark constituents by reducing their original 
weights to 10%. 
𝐼𝑓 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
> 10%  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑤𝑖
𝑗′
= 10%                                ∀ 𝑖  (7) 
With J being the sum of the truncated weights of the constituents in group j. 
 𝐽 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑗′𝑛
𝑖=1              (8) 
After that, we follow the process in group k of benchmark constituents
10
. We must 
consider both the previously recalculated weights of the constituents of group j (8) and 
the original weights of the constituents of group k and obtain the sum of both groups, 
constituent by constituent (from the highest to the lowest weight). If the sum is greater 
                                                          
10
 In unusual cases when the number of constituents with a value over 10% is five or more, the fifth and 
subsequent constituents in group j are included in group k. Then, the weights of all constituents in group k 
are truncated to 5% following the Directive 2009/65/EC. 
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than 40%, then reduce the weights of the constituents in group k from their original 
weights to 5%. 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑝 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛  
𝐼𝑓(𝐽 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑘𝑝
𝑖=1 ) ≤ 40%  then  𝑤𝑖
𝑘′′ = 𝑤𝑖
𝑘    
𝐼𝑓(𝐽 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑘𝑝
𝑖=1 ) > 40%  then  𝑤𝑖
𝑘′ = 5%   (9)  
𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑝  
We define 𝑤 as the sum of the previously obtained weights of the benchmark 
constituents fulfilling the limits of portfolio concentration, i.e., the recalculated weights 
of group j, and k and the original weights of group l. The sum of these weights will be 
100% only if the previous steps (7) and (9) have modified none of the weights of the 
constituents.  
𝑤 = (𝐽 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑘′𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑘′′𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑙𝑛
𝑖=1 )                 (10) 
Finally, we obtain sAS as the difference between 100% minus w, and it shows the 
accumulated excess weights over the concentration limits, which are not a consequence 
of active management. Thus, sAS is the minimum AS that should be found in a portfolio 
following the diversification rules imposed by the Directive 2009/65/EC. 
 𝑠𝐴𝑆 = 100% − 𝑤      (11) 
We apply the algorithm to monthly information on the constituents of all domestic 
Eurozone benchmarks included in our sample. Table 2 shows a summary of the annual 
values of sAS for each benchmark during 2002-2016. We find assorted evidence due to 
the EU diversification requirements and the different levels of concentration in the 
domestic Eurozone benchmarks. PSI 20 (Portugal), ATX 20 (Austria) and IBEX 35 
(Spain) obtain the highest average sAS values, with 22.4%, 18.60% and 17.99%, 
respectively. By contrast, there are benchmarks that present much lower levels of sAS, 
such as CAC 40 (France), DAX 30 (Germany) and OMXH 25 (Finland), with 3.31%, 
5.50% and 5.80%, respectively. These results provide evidence that the Directive 
2009/65/EC negatively influences the accuracy of the AS shown for managers who work 
with very concentrated domestic Eurozone benchmarks. In contrast, the sAS evidence for 
the least concentrated domestic Eurozone benchmarks shows that AS reported by 
managers who work in France, Germany and Finland are much more accurate. Therefore, 
our findings confirm that AS values obtained in different domestic Eurozone markets are 





Table 1  
Domestic equity benchmarks. Summary statistics. This table presents descriptive statistics of the ten domestic equity benchmarks included in our sample from 2002 to 2016 for 
every year and country. This table shows (1) the maximum weight of a constituent in each benchmark, (2) the number of constituents over a 10% weight in the benchmark and 
(3) the median value of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which is a proxy for the concentration level of each benchmark. 
  (AEX 25) NETHERLANDS   (ATHEX 20) GREECE   (ATX 20) AUSTRIA   (BEL 20) BELGIUM   (CAC 40) FRANCE 
Year (1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
2002 14.96 4 758.72 
 
na na na 
 
23.16 3 998.55 
 
23.22 3 1138.10 
 
16.46 1 506.50 
2003 14.62 3 732.33 
 
na na na 
 
21.29 4 1070.18 
 
24.34 3 1172.94 
 
15.78 1 497.49 
2004 11.79 4 762.24 
 
na na na 
 
21.14 3 1123.12 
 
24.72 3 1102.95 
 
18.23 2 546.02 
2005 16.60 3 888.66 
 
na na na 
 
21.93 3 1111.75 
 
22.72 5 958.86 
 
15.68 2 556.08 
2006 16.51 3 888.07 
 
22.40 4 1063.40 
 
22.44 4 1061.21 
 
18.41 4 1032.01 
 
13.46 1 498.35 
2007 18.90 3 850.58 
 
23.00 3 1010.90 
 
19.69 4 1037.10 
 
18.71 5 973.77 
 
12.95 1 451.46 
2008 23.66 4 977.16 
 
23.19 3 951.44 
 
20.19 4 1058.73 
 
24.21 5 956.23 
 
17.03 1 516.15 
2009 22.63 3 789.66 
 
27.23 3 1025.26 
 
20.14 3 920.94 
 
19.50 4 809.73 
 
17.96 1 510.64 
2010 17.12 3 812.40 
 
23.46 2 947.00 
 
21.58 4 945.52 
 
19.27 3 731.46 
 
12.82 1 469.62 
2011 19.42 3 859.65 
 
20.19 4 877.85 
 
21.83 3 901.40 
 
17.90 2 732.05 
 
14.39 2 475.32 
2012 18.22 3 829.96 
 
23.25 4 895.87 
 
19.93 4 833.69 
 
14.62 3 754.52 
 
14.00 2 521.46 
2013 16.75 3 772.72 
 
24.14 3 913.24 
 
21.34 3 995.96 
 
14.40 3 771.00 
 
13.44 2 499.09 
2014 17.23 3 835.61 
 
18.51 4 813.38 
 
19.92 4 893.24 
 
15.69 4 788.18 
 
12.84 2 478.64 
2015 17.40 3 838.33 
 
30.47 3 879.03 
 
22.10 4 924.49 
 
15.69 4 782.64 
 
11.23 2 443.79 
2016  17.18 3 818.62 
 
22.07 3 920.17 
 
21.86 3 930.21 
 
13.94 4 788.93 
 
17.99 1 414.13 
Average 17.53 3 827.65 
 
23.45 3 936.14 
 
21.24 4 987.07 
 
19.16 4 899.56 
 
14.95 1 492.32 
                
  
   
  (DAX 30) GERMANY   (FTSE MIB 40) ITALY   (IBEX 35) SPAIN   (OMXH 25) FINLAND   (PSI 20) PORTUGAL 
Year (1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
2002 12.42 3 643.79 
 
na na na 
 
23.38 3 992.27 
 
11.77 2 625.64 
 
na na na 
2003 13.12 2 642.16 
 
na na na 
 
21.39 3 965.95 
 
12.56 4 655.12 
 
na na na 
2004 12.28 2 622.56 
 
17.58 2 743.27 
 
21.94 3 979.97 
 
41.55 3 649.4 
 
na na na 
2005 10.82 2 590.77 
 
20.78 2 827.95 
 
19.54 3 893.17 
 
11.49 4 635.24 
 
na na na 
2006 11.26 2 577.32 
 
17.77 3 838.51 
 
17.55 3 869.98 
 
52.41 2 618.89 
 
na na na 
2007 10.86 2 580.97 
 
17.15 3 833.89 
 
20.22 4 887.65 
 
12.26 2 615.66 
 
20.46 4 994.70 
2008 13.91 2 581.54 
 
18.27 5 854.40 
 
23.89 4 1058.19 
 
31.79 3 627.26 
 
18.59 4 1001.91 
2009 10.85 2 589.72 
 
16.77 4 824.19 
 
25.83 3 1237.91 
 
11.00 3 603.39 
 
20.41 5 920.94 
2010 10.53 1 562.14 
 
16.40 4 824.02 
 
23.74 3 1224.26 
 
10.47 2 607.79 
 
19.88 4 1025.5 
2011 10.44 1 553.67 
 
17.11 4 765.16 
 
21.50 3 1032.22 
 
12.99 4 625.23 
 
20.05 4 1113.92 
2012 10.15 1 563.90 
 
16.56 3 673.14 
 
19.11 4 974.83 
 
13.03 3 641.00 
 
19.41 4 1177.02 
2013 10.25 1 573.29 
 
15.35 2 650.56 
 
18.85 4 900.63 
 
15.84 3 625.06 
 
17.39 5 1076.45 
2014 10.62 1 571.22 
 
15.97 4 685.55 
 
18.76 3 818.48 
 
11.30 3 645.33 
 
19.72 5 1023.96 
2015 10.27 1 560.72 
 
13.76 2 639.99 
 
17.86 4 788.22 
 
10.98 3 626.93 
 
18.22 5 944.35 
2016 10.25 1 554.47 
 
15.52 3 623.15 
 
14.94 3 697.10 
 
10.96 2 614.17 
 
16.55 5 965.22 





Spurious Active Share (sAS) from 2002 to 2016. This table presents the annual statistics of sAS (in percent terms) of the ten domestic equity benchmarks included in our sample 























Average St. Dev. 
2002 12.69 na 18.70 24.76 4.51 7.22 na 19.24 5.51 na 13.23 7.28 
2003 12.11 na 19.61 24.88 3.42 9.44 na 18.56 8.44 na 14.61 6.95 
2004 12.93 na 23.58 19.59 5.68 7.84 10.16 18.64 7.20 na 13.20 6.21 
2005 17.81 na 23.47 19.19 5.10 5.68 13.39 16.21 4.87 na 13.21 6.74 
2006 17.22 20.24 19.78 20.88 2.96 3.70 15.30 16.39 4.51 na 13.44 7.09 
2007 16.51 19.96 22.53 19.32 2.38 3.42 15.68 16.53 4.51 23.38 14.42 7.59 
2008 19.48 18.62 20.96 17.69 5.15 5.67 15.87 20.71 5.74 21.08 15.10 6.45 
2009 12.61 18.75 18.24 14.70 4.07 5.65 14.72 25.03 4.61 19.36 13.77 6.71 
2010 13.45 16.99 17.22 11.85 2.22 6.28 13.98 25.01 4.45 22.09 13.35 7.04 
2011 14.25 14.56 16.34 11.86 3.08 5.04 10.88 21.54 5.43 24.87 12.79 6.73 
2012 13.54 14.73 15.75 12.55 4.61 3.42 8.46 20.71 6.24 25.21 12.52 6.68 
2013 12.30 14.50 19.54 13.00 3.14 4.10 7.97 16.89 5.91 24.99 12.23 6.71 
2014 14.09 14.71 15.11 13.22 2.33 4.20 8.33 13.22 5.78 21.26 11.23 5.57 
2015 14.11 17.31 14.05 13.32 0.70 5.45 6.88 11.52 4.29 21.83 10.95 6.17 
2016 12.40 16.70 14.13 12.47 0.32 5.40 6.10 9.59 3.38 19.98 10.05 5.89 
Average  14.37 16.76 18.60 16.48 3.31 5.50 11.44 17.99 5.80 22.40 13.26 6.65 
St. Dev. 2.29 2.19 3.17 4.59 1.58 1.70 3.60 4.41 1.27 2.11 1.39 0.53 
12 
 
4. Determination of the significant AS above the spurious level 
To obtain proper valuations of the active management of domestic equity funds in the 
Eurozone, we first define domestic Eurozone sAS-based benchmarks, which fulfil the 
portfolio concentration limits of the Directive 2009/65/EC. Then, we propose specific 
thresholds at 90%, 95% and 99% for each year and market to determine the statistical 
significance of each AS obtained. 
The first step of this process is focused on the distribution of the sAS obtained in 
the previous section to the benchmark constituents belonging to subgroup 𝑘′′and group l, 
both of which can incorporate additional weights because 𝑤𝑖
𝑘′′  and 𝑤𝑖
𝑙 are below the 
limits of portfolio concentration, such as 10% or 5%, respectively. This distribution is 
proportional to the original weights of these constituents in the benchmark and should 
never lead the new weights to exceed such portfolio limits. 
From equation (11): 𝑠𝐴𝑆 = 100% − 𝑤, we define 𝑤′ as the sum of the weights of 
the constituents, which fulfils the distribution of the EU diversification rules included in 
sAS. 
𝑤´ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑘′′𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑙𝑛
𝑖=1      (12) 
We identify the proportion of the original weight of each constituent in the 





                                                                 ∀ 𝑖  (13) 
In the next step, we first distribute sAS proportionally to 𝑤𝑖
𝑘′′, constituent by 
constituent (from the highest to the lowest weight). The distribution will stop when the 




𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑝 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛  
 
𝐼𝑓(𝐽 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖




𝑖=1 ) < 40%  then  𝑤𝑖




𝑘′′′ ≤  10%     ∀ 𝑖 𝜖 𝑤𝑖
𝑘′′′      
 
𝐼𝑓(𝐽 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖




𝑖=1 ) = 40% then 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝  (14) 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑝  
                                                          
11
 In unusual cases when the proportional increase leads the new weight of a constituent included in group k 
to exceed the 10% limit, the algorithm should be initialised in step (7) with the recalculated weights. 
13 
 
Then, we continue with the proportional distribution of sAS to group l, constituent 
by constituent (from the highest to the lowest weight) as long as sAS is higher than zero 
because step (14) has not fully finished distributing sAS
12
. 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑝 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 
 I𝑓(𝑤 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑘′′′𝑝
𝑖=1 ) < 100%   then  𝑤𝑖
𝑙′ = 𝑟𝑤𝑖 x 𝑠𝐴𝑆 + 𝑤𝑖
𝑙 
𝐵𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑖
𝑙′ ≤ 5%                                                          ∀ 𝑖 𝜖 𝑤𝑖
𝑙             (15) 
𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑝 
We define 𝑤′′as the sum of the weights of the benchmark constituents fulfilling 
the limits of portfolio concentration. If the sum of the constituent weights is 100%, the 




𝑤′′ = (𝑤 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑘′′′𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑙′𝑛
𝑖=1 )                         ∀ 𝑖  (16) 
Now, the constituent weights of each domestic Eurozone benchmark previously 
obtained are fulfilling the limits of portfolio concentration as stipulated by Directive 
2009/65/EC. Next, we perform an analysis to calculate AS-thresholds that represent the 
minimum values of AS to confirm that the analysed portfolio is significantly active at 
90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels. Due to the lack of information about fitted 
parametric distributions of the benchmark constituent weights, we develop confidence 
thresholds based on the historical distributions of these constituent weights in our study 
period. First, we achieve 200,000 monthly simulations with 𝑤′′ using a 60-month fixed 
rolling window
14
. Second, we normalize up to 100% of the weight obtained in each 
simulation to assure that the total sum of the weights for each simulation is 100%. Then, 
we apply steps (2) to (16) from the algorithm presented in the previous sections to 
comply with Directive 2009/65/EC. Then, we obtain the differences between the real and 
the simulated weights of each benchmark constituent. That is, we calculate the original 
AS, equation (1), but we replace 𝑤𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑖 with the simulated weight of each benchmark 
constituent fulfilling the EU concentration limits. 
Third, we develop AS-thresholds with the monthly simulations of AS for each 
month and domestic Eurozone benchmark; to do this, we use statistical inference 
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 In unusual cases when the proportional increase leads the new weight of a constituent included in group l 
to exceed the 5% limit, the algorithm should be initialised in step (9) with the recalculated weights. 
13
 If the sum of both constituent weights is not 100% and (𝐽 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖




𝑖=1 ) < 40, it is necessary 
to repeat steps (14) and (15) until  𝑤′′ = 100%. 
14
 For ATHEX 20 (Greece), FTSE MIB 40 (Italy), and PSI 20 (Portugal) the simulations begin when the 
sixty first weights are available. Further details about the simulation are not shown for the sake of brevity.  
14 
 
according to the values for the 90th, 95th and 99th percentiles of all AS simulations for 
each month and benchmark. These three thresholds will be the minimum values of AS 
required to confirm that the analysed portfolio is significantly active at 90%, 95% and 
99% confidence levels. 
Table 3 presents the monthly average of AS-thresholds for each year in each 
domestic Eurozone benchmark during the 2007-2016 period15. These results are driven by 
both the level of concentration of the different domestic Eurozone benchmarks and the 
EU limits on portfolio concentration, as we discussed in the previous section. 
The striking differences reported by Table 3 confirm our hypothesis that the AS 
results in the domestic equity funds in the Eurozone being not directly compatible due to 
portfolio concentration limits defined in Directive 2009/65/EC. For instance, a domestic 
equity fund in the Portuguese market with an AS of 20% in 2013 shows no significant 
active management at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels. Instead, a domestic equity 
fund in the French market in the same period with an AS of 20% is significantly active at 
90% and 95% but not at the 99% confidence level. 
Table 3 allows testing for the statistical significance of the original AS obtained 
by domestic equity funds of the Eurozone for the period 2007-2016. Table 3 also shows 
consistent and stable thresholds across benchmarks and years, which leads us to use them 
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AS-thresholds of domestic equity benchmarks of the Eurozone. This table presents the monthly average (in percent terms) of AS-thresholds at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence 













Year AS90% AS95% AS99%  
AS90% AS95% AS99%  
AS90% AS95% AS99%  
AS90% AS95% AS99%  
AS90% AS95% AS99% 
2007 24.92 26.13 28.59 
 
na na na 
 
28.50 31.50 36.28 
 
27.65 29.53 32.82 
 
16.44 17.12 18.52 
2008 28.66 30.25 33.17 
 
na na na 
 
28.63 35.71 40.64 
 
29.91 31.17 33.95 
 
19.04 19.67 20.93 
2009 24.38 25.99 28.97 
 
na na na 
 
25.23 29.19 33.14 
 
28.44 29.84 32.37 
 
16.82 17.55 19.02 
2010 24.48 25.75 28.38 
 
na na na 
 
23.44 26.57 29.62 
 
24.50 26.16 29.39 
 
16.03 16.75 18.20 
2011 25.49 26.53 28.64 
 
30.03 31.66 34.02 
 
23.41 27.06 30.74 
 
25.27 26.78 29.82 
 
18.41 19.14 20.48 
2012 24.03 25.17 27.23 
 
29.76 30.80 32.87 
 
23.49 27.73 31.27 
 
25.01 26.72 29.70 
 
20.33 20.99 22.21 
2013 21.45 22.58 24.59 
 
28.52 29.69 31.92 
 
26.39 30.44 34.52 
 
24.35 25.85 28.12 
 
16.87 17.66 20.03 
2014 21.73 22.82 24.38 
 
28.37 29.80 32.41 
 
22.63 26.48 30.08 
 
23.85 24.88 26.81 
 
12.99 13.77 17.67 
2015 21.08 22.01 24.15 
 
29.72 31.02 33.50 
 
21.24 25.32 29.03 
 
22.85 23.68 25.26 
 
11.54 12.25 16.12 
2016 19.81 20.41 21.54 
 
29.97 31.23 33.66 
 
19.22 22.75 26.40 
 
23.74 24.99 27.66 
 
11.25 11.95 15.88 
Average 23.60 24.76 26.96  29.40 30.70 33.06  24.22 28.28 32.17  25.56 26.96 29.59  15.97 16.69 18.91 












Year AS90% AS95% AS99%  
AS90% AS95% AS99%  
AS90% AS95% AS99%  
AS90% AS95% AS99%  
AS90% AS95% AS99% 
2007 15.43 16.16 17.50 
 
na na na 
 
25.77 27.04 28.39 
 
22.10 23.54 26.21 
 
na na na 
2008 16.72 17.42 18.79 
 
na na na 
 
29.80 31.13 33.04 
 
23.56 25.00 27.74 
 
na na na 
2009 14.68 15.23 16.31 
 
25.48 26.55 28.89 
 
32.68 33.55 36.00 
 
19.34 20.54 22.90 
 
na na na 
2010 14.87 15.43 16.52 
 
23.93 24.94 27.07 
 
32.70 33.54 35.27 
 
15.95 17.15 19.62 
 
na na na 
2011 17.33 17.96 19.20 
 
22.68 23.62 25.30 
 
29.36 30.41 32.00 
 
15.38 16.11 17.63 
 
na na na 
2012 17.25 18.15 19.70 
 
21.75 22.61 24.13 
 
28.01 28.7 30.22 
 
15.60 16.34 17.78 
 
36.62 37.66 40.61 
2013 17.32 18.26 20.19 
 
20.13 21.00 22.73 
 
26.20 26.93 28.57 
 
13.77 14.64 16.21 
 
32.27 32.77 34.57 
2014 15.33 16.29 18.42 
 
18.16 18.94 20.55 
 
22.24 23.03 24.57 
 
11.75 12.34 13.70 
 
30.41 31.50 32.81 
2015 15.01 15.86 17.75 
 
18.29 18.96 20.35 
 
21.52 22.41 24.08 
 
14.39 14.94 16.11 
 
28.90 30.14 32.75 
2016 15.29 15.85 17.77 
 
20.20 20.92 22.17 
 
18.17 19.02 20.52 
 
15.49 16.07 17.16 
 
29.42 30.73 33.69 
Average 15.92 16.66 18.22  21.33 22.19 23.90  26.65 27.58 29.27  16.73 17.67 19.51  31.52 32.56 34.89 
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5. Active management in domestic equity funds of the Eurozone 
This section aims to measure the level of active management of the domestic equity funds 
registered in each Eurozone market. We analyse a comprehensive sample of Eurozone 
open-end mutual funds categorized as domestic equity funds by Morningstar
16
. We obtain 
the portfolio holdings, the Total Net Assets (TNA), the domicile and the primary 
prospectus benchmarks. The sample covers the same period as the previous section, from 
January 2007 to December 2016. The initial sample drawn from Morningstar consists of 
570 domestic equity funds. This sample is free of survivorship bias because it includes 
both active and terminated funds. To avoid potential heterogeneity problems in the fund 
sample that could lead to non-comparable AS results, we exclude those equity funds from 
our initial sample whose primary prospectus benchmarks are not clearly defined or are 
different from those previously included in our domestic benchmark sample. We also 
exclude Index funds and other categories (e.g., Funds of Funds) because their investment 
policy conflicts with the objectives of our analysis
17
. 
Our final sample includes 23,749 portfolio holdings from 381 domestic equity 
funds that have a primary prospectus benchmark included in our domestic benchmark 
sample. The database used in this analysis relies on monthly portfolio holdings 
information from January 2007 to December 2016. We work with monthly portfolio 
holdings when this information is provided and with quarterly portfolio holdings 
otherwise. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of our final sample. The most relevant 
mutual fund industries in the Eurozone, such as France, Germany, Spain and Italy, are 
also obviously important in our sample. However, the average fund size and the median 
number of portfolio holdings are assorted across the different Eurozone markets. 
Focusing on the original approach of AS by Cremers and Petajisto (2009), we 
formulate actual active share (aAS) considering the level of concentration existing in the 
domestic equity funds in the Eurozone markets and the limits of the portfolio 
concentration on European regulation. We define aAS as the difference between the 
monthly AS obtained for each domestic equity fund minus its monthly AS-threshold 
obtained in the previous section at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels. That is, aAS is 
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 According to Morningstar, domestic equity funds are defined as funds with at least 70% of assets 
invested in domestic stocks. 
17
 We analyse 67% out of all the domestic equity funds registered in the Eurozone domestic fund market 
during our sample period (Source: Morningstar). Domestic equity funds with a different primary prospectus 
benchmark (20%) or an unclear benchmark (7%) were excluded, as well as Index Funds and Funds of 
Funds (6%).  
17 
 
the level of significant active management over the spurious level driven by the 
benchmark concentration and the EU concentration limits. 
𝑎𝐴𝑆90%,95%,99% = 𝐴𝑆 − 𝐴𝑆_𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑90%,95%,99%  (17) 
Table 5 shows the average and the standard deviation values of both AS and aAS in 
each Eurozone market using the AS-threshold of 95%
18
. Each value obtained by each 
fund and period is not sensitive to the number of funds included in each market because 
these active management measures are individually applied to each fund. 
Table 5 provides evidence that aAS significantly corrects the potential bias in the 
original AS caused by both the benchmark concentration and the EU portfolio 
diversification rules. This finding is more evident in those markets with the highest AS: 
the Belgian market, the Greek market and the Portuguese market with AS values of 
57.63%, 53.43% and 52%, respectively
19
. These values subside into much lower levels of 
aAS95%, 29.62%, 22.74%, and 19.45%, respectively.  
Further, we find diverse results in the dispersion of both AS and aAS measures. 
There are markets where domestic equity funds with high values in these active 
management measures are not distinctively different from other funds with low AS and 
aAS values. But our novel aAS should not have contradictory performance implications 
with those obtained by the original AS results (Cremers et al., 2016) because the active 
management range is constant for both measures in each market and period.
20
  
Table 5 shows assorted results and thus the question arises as to whether the level 
of active management in the Eurozone markets presents significant differences. Using the 
Kruskal-Wallis test, we test the significance of actual active management in domestic 
equity funds across 10 different Eurozone markets. We apply the test with the monthly 
aAS95% from January 2007 to December 2016
21
. Table 6 shows conclusive results. There 
are significant differences in the active management between domestic equity funds in 
the Eurozone markets at a 1% confidence level
22
. 
We apply the Nemenyi test – comparing markets pairwise – with the aim of 
detecting which markets are producing the significant differences in the level of active 
management. Table 6 shows that France, Italy and Spain are the most economically 
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 The results are also consistent when we use the threshold of 90% and the threshold of 99% developed in 
the previous section. Detailed results per year are available upon request. 
19
 The conclusions about the Belgian market should be taken with caution because the monthly portfolio 
holdings are very limited. 
20
 The only difference between both AS and aAS is the subtraction of the AS-Threshold, which is constant 
for each domestic benchmark and period. 
21
 The monthly aAS95% used in this analysis has been standardized to compare the results.  
22
 The results are also consistent for aAS90% and aAS99%. Detailed results are available upon request. 
18 
 
important markets that drive these results. The French market presents significant 
differences in active management compared with the rest of the domestic equity funds in 
the Eurozone. The primary implication of this result, together with both the average AS 
and aAS95% (Table 5), is that domestic equity funds in France are – significantly – the 
most active in the Eurozone. Next, the Spanish and Italian domestic equity funds present 
similar active management levels but significant differences with the rest of the 
Eurozone. Although the Spanish benchmark IBEX 35 obtains a larger spurious AS than 
does the Italian FTSE MIB 40, the actual levels of active management of Spanish and 
Italian domestic equity funds are similar through the aAS95% and significantly higher than 
the rest of the domestic equity funds of the Eurozone, with the exception of French funds. 
Similar to the French domestic benchmark, the low levels of concentration of the 
German DAX 30 should anticipate higher levels of aAS of domestic equity funds in this 
market. That is, EU diversification rules fulfilled by domestic equity funds registered in 
Germany should not be in conflict with the well-diversified DAX 30. However, we now 
have evidence of the contrary. This market does not present significant differences – in 
terms of active management – from other domestic equity fund industries, whose 
domestic benchmarks are much more concentrated. Overall, the most economically 
relevant fund industries in the Eurozone show significant differences in the actual levels 




Domestic equity funds. Summary statistics. This table shows the number of domestic equity funds registered in each Eurozone market and (1) the number of portfolio holdings 












No. domestic equity funds  11  13  10  6  150 
Year (1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
2007 67 26 406.51 
 
65 50 190.29 
 
37 50 178.31 
 
6 42 30.01 
 
298 58 256.21 
2008 61 25 292.70 
 
60 45 109.47 
 
35 44 111.37 
 
19 44 16.23 
 
455 51 158.67 
2009 62 27 253.90 
 
69 42 68.99 
 
56 40 81.46 
 
19 51 10.75 
 
779 53 156.94 
2010 64 27 482.75 
 
60 41 52.50 
 
58 41 155.08 
 
23 51 20.30 
 
731 56 158.03 
2011 73 28 472.83 
 
62 35 51.00 
 
68 41 143.19 
 
13 44 36.50 
 
728 55 151.70 
2012 76 27 407.41 
 
42 39 37.18 
 
66 40 150.12 
 
12 55 65.23 
 
795 56 138.55 
2013 78 27 407.52 
 
44 36 52.26 
 
76 35 177.48 
 
3 53 69.40 
 
841 61 172.84 
2014 61 26 426.61 
 
87 42 60.89 
 
78 33 181.93 
 
na na na 
 
902 61 174.99 
2015 48 29 272.58 
 
82 41 39.63 
 
81 34 197.66 
 
na na na 
 
895 61 177.94 
2016 51 29 233.21 
 
81 39 36.08 
 
84 36 219.55 
 
na na na 
 
972 61 198.24 
Average 64 27 365.60  65 41 69.83  64 39 159.62  14 49 35.49  740 57 174.41 











No. domestic equity funds 65  34   45  32  15 
Year (1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
2007 379 56 523.83 
 
177 81 207.68 
 
220 45 111.67 
 
139 38 140.68 
 
180 34 78.19 
2008 408 51 346.28 
 
219 70 131.50 
 
240 38 52.82 
 
168 35 84.45 
 
180 35 40.92 
2009 455 52 329.67 
 
273 66 95.78 
 
241 38 35.47 
 
191 36 92.38 
 
150 34 29.64 
2010 422 56 453.39 
 
257 66 101.29 
 
296 37 35.88 
 
227 36 122.08 
 
165 33 29.58 
2011 404 58 571.60 
 
251 68 90.13 
 
307 36 34.81 
 
248 34 120.69 
 
165 31 19.27 
2012 418 52 558.67 
 
244 69 88.08 
 
313 36 30.34 
 
268 33 109.13 
 
171 32 12.38 
2013 382 48 615.32 
 
182 73 117.47 
 
371 38 52.76 
 
276 34 125.72 
 
149 31 16.55 
2014 373 46 698.86 
 
190 77 155.59 
 
403 42 109.36 
 
302 34 130.04 
 
143 34 25.93 
2015 389 47 776.34 
 
191 80 178.63 
 
430 41 115.37 
 
251 33 154.36 
 
125 31 22.51 
2016 388 48 740.70 
 
192 75 155.65 
 
452 39 92.80 
 
243 34 156.79 
 
118 29 18.65 




Actual active management in domestic equity funds in the Eurozone. This table presents the monthly average AS (in percent terms) proposed by Cremers and Petajisto (2009), 











Year AS aAS95% St. Dev  
AS aAS95% St. Dev  
AS aAS95% St. Dev  
AS aAS95% St. Dev  
AS aAS95% St. Dev 
2007 36.80 10.67 11.91 
 
na na na 
 
48.72 17.22 4.17 
 
39.75 10.22 36.85 
 
50.68 33.56 16.44 
2008 37.17 6.91 12.26 
 
na na na 
 
45.87 10.16 8.16 
 
53.32 22.16 23.56 
 
50.18 30.51 17.15 
2009 33.82 7.83 12.09 
 
na na na 
 
52.99 23.80 5.70 
 
54.45 24.61 12.94 
 
47.40 29.84 18.67 
2010 34.13 8.38 14.48 
 
na na na 
 
45.94 19.37 8.34 
 
47.08 20.91 17.95 
 
49.23 32.48 18.34 
2011 33.56 7.03 10.88 
 
65.68 34.03 8.26 
 
43.98 16.92 12.19 
 
57.31 30.52 17.33 
 
51.20 32.07 17.26 
2012 36.29 11.12 11.31 
 
62.25 31.45 6.18 
 
41.56 13.83 10.82 
 
74.49 47.78 24.54 
 
51.00 30.02 17.16 
2013 35.55 12.97 11.91 
 
52.29 22.60 4.50 
 
41.64 11.20 10.00 
 
76.99 51.13 19.01 
 
48.15 30.49 18.15 
2014 37.63 14.81 16.93 
 
49.34 19.54 5.58 
 
44.64 18.16 8.05 
 
na na na 
 
51.87 38.10 19.17 
2015 51.89 29.88 16.66 
 
46.64 15.62 8.94 
 
48.31 22.99 10.08 
 
na na na 
 
53.71 41.47 19.40 
2016 57.69 37.28 6.81 
 
44.40 13.17 14.95 
 
45.25 22.50 11.71 
 
na na na 
 
52.91 40.96 19.76 
Average 39.45 14.69 12.53 
 
53.43 22.74 8.07 
 
45.89 17.62 8.92 
 
57.63 29.62 21.74 
 











Year AS aAS95% St. Dev  
AS aAS95% St. Dev  
AS aAS95% St. Dev  
AS aAS95% St. Dev  
AS aAS95% St. Dev 
2007 30.74 14.58 12.48 
 
na na na 
 
46.92 19.88 9.79 
 
42.36 18.82 17.83 
 
na na na 
2008 33.88 16.46 11.89 
 
na na na 
 
48.47 17.35 9.41 
 
42.43 17.43 18.39 
 
na na na 
2009 33.15 17.92 11.16 
 
48.91 22.37 16.62 
 
52.19 18.64 13.86 
 
39.31 18.77 17.64 
 
na na na 
2010 32.41 16.98 15.60 
 
51.42 26.48 17.66 
 
54.52 20.98 12.83 
 
39.10 21.95 18.43 
 
na na na 
2011 34.25 16.29 16.24 
 
50.91 27.29 17.48 
 
57.17 26.76 11.74 
 
41.19 25.09 17.96 
 
na na na 
2012 34.14 15.98 16.76 
 
48.89 26.28 15.91 
 
52.64 23.93 16.57 
 
40.91 24.56 17.30 
 
57.73 20.08 5.91 
2013 31.84 13.58 13.40 
 
47.91 26.91 16.06 
 
51.55 24.62 14.72 
 
40.95 26.30 16.52 
 
54.06 21.30 5.17 
2014 36.43 20.15 19.32 
 
46.17 27.24 14.91 
 
52.64 29.61 16.20 
 
41.03 28.69 15.72 
 
51.38 19.88 3.74 
2015 38.88 23.01 19.04 
 
47.38 28.41 14.57 
 
50.82 28.41 17.99 
 
39.97 25.02 16.59 
 
48.74 18.60 3.65 
2016 42.33 26.48 18.42   47.58 26.66 14.10   50.88 31.86 20.33   41.42 25.35 14.53   48.09 17.37 3.41 
Average 34.81 18.14 15.43 
 
48.65 26.46 15.91 
 
51.78 24.20 14.34 
 
40.87 23.2 17.09 
 





Differences in aAS95% of domestic equity funds of the Eurozone. As this table shows in column 2, the Kruskal-Wallis test robust chi-squared clustered, p.value reported in 
parentheses reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Columns 3-11 show the results of the Nemenyi test for each country pairwise in the period 2007-
2016. The Nemenyi test is a statistical post hoc test with the aim of finding the groups of data that differ after a statistical test of multiple comparisons. If the result is near one, 




  Nemenyi test 
 Kruskal Wallis test NETHERLANDS GREECE AUSTRIA BELGIUM FRANCE GERMANY ITALY SPAIN FINLAND 
NETHERLANDS 0.578 (0.000) - - - - - - - - - 
           
GREECE 0.722 (0.000) 1.000 - - - - - - - - 
   
        
AUSTRIA 0.538 (0.000) 1.000 1.000 - - - - - - - 
   
        BELGIUM 1.269 (0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - - - - - 
   
        
FRANCE 1.306 (0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - - - - 
   
        
GERMANY 0.488 (0.000) 0.715 0.999 0.948 0.000 0.000 - - - - 
   
        
ITALY 0.811 (0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 - - - 
   
        
SPAIN 0.888 (0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.824 - - 
   
        FINLAND 0.422 (0.000) 0.515 0.774 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.473 0.000 0.000 - 
   
        




This study is the first to examine how both the domestic benchmark concentration and the 
Directive 2009/65/EC on risk of portfolio diversification may distort the accuracy of the 
original AS of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) in the Eurozone mutual fund industry. Our 
unbiased approach has important implications for policymakers and practitioners in terms 
of identification of an active management map of the Eurozone fund industry. 
We develop an algorithm to capture the spurious AS, defined as the minimum AS, 
which is not a consequence of active decisions made by equity fund managers. The 
results provide evidence of the unfeasibility to make direct AS comparisons in the 
Eurozone and lead us to obtain three AS-thresholds per domestic equity benchmark, 
which are the minimum values of AS needed to confirm that domestic equity funds are 
significantly active at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels. 
Finally, we assess active management in a comprehensive sample of domestic 
equity funds registered in the Eurozone for the period 2007-2016. To do that, we define 
actual AS as the measure used to identify significant active management over the 
spurious AS level driven by the domestic equity benchmark concentration and the EU 
concentration limits. Our evidence suggests that the level of actual active management in 
the Eurozone presents significant differences. Focusing on the most relevant fund 
industries in the Eurozone, we find that France is the most active domestic equity fund 
market. Followed by the Spanish and Italian markets that show high levels of actual 
active management despite the large concentration in their domestic benchmarks. 
Conversely, domestic equity funds registered in Germany show lower levels of active 
management.  
Our findings support the hypothesis that our actual AS measure corrects the 
potential bias in the original AS caused by both the domestic benchmark concentration 




Appendix 1: Detailed explanation of algorithm 
 
By applying our algorithm, users will obtain domestic Eurozone benchmarks which fulfil 
the portfolio concentration limits of the Directive 2009/65/EC. In our study, the algorithm 
was applied on a monthly basis. (Figures in parentheses relate to equations of the 
algorithm included in the main body of the paper.) 
 
Input: The weights of the constituents that are part of each domestic Eurozone 
benchmark. 
Output: The weights of the constituents that are part of each domestic Eurozone 
benchmark fulfilling the limits of portfolio concentration of the Directive 2009/65/EC. 
 
Terms 
First: The weight of each constituent, called 𝑤𝑖, is positive, and the sum of their weights 
for each benchmark is 100%. (2)  (3) 
Second: Limits of portfolio concentration showed in article 52 on the Directive 
2009/65/EC sort 𝑤𝑖 into three groups. 
Group 1) 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑤𝑖 > 10%  (4) 
Group 2) 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 5% ≤ 𝑤𝑖 ≤ 10%   (5) 
Group 3) 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑖 < 5% (6) 
Third: The sum of the weights of the constituents included in Group 1 and Group 2 shall 
not exceed 40%. 




1. Initialise the process with Group 1: Reduce weights of its constituents from their 
original weights to 10%. (7) 
2. Consider jointly the recalculated weights of the constituents of Group 1 (step 1) 
and the original weights of the constituents of Group 2 and obtain the sum of 
both groups, constituent by constituent (from the highest to the lowest). (8) 
If the sum is greater than 40%, then reduce the weights of the constituents in 
Group 2 from their original weights to 5%. (9) 
3. Include Group 3 in the process: Define 𝑤 as the sum of the accumulated weights 
obtained in step 1, step 2 and the accumulated weights of the constituents in 
Group 3. (10) 
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4. Define sAS as the difference between 100% minus w  
𝑠𝐴𝑆 = 100% − 𝑤  (11) 
5. Distribute sAS among the constituents that can incorporate an additional weight 
following the restrictions included in Terms and proportionally to their original 
weights. 
When the proportional increase leads the new weight of a constituent included in 
Group 2 to exceed the 10% limit then the process should be initialised in step 1 
with the recalculated weights.    (12) (13) (14) 
When the proportional increase leads the new weight of a constituent included in 
Group 3 to exceed the 5% limit then the process should be initialised in step 2 
with the recalculated weights. (15) 
6. Obtain the sum of the accumulated weights of the constituents in Group 1 (step 
1), Group 2 (step 2) and Group 3 (step 5), constituent by constituent (from the 
highest to the lowest). 
While sAS is higher than zero, continue the proportional distribution described 
in step 5. 
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